The long-running Gray’s Timber Products Limited (GTPL), which was initially heard by a single Special Commissioner and has recently been heard by the Scottish Inner House of the Court of Session, has reached the Supreme Court, writes Komal Saily.
To summarise: G, a director of GTPL, held 5% of the total issued share capital of Gray’s Group Limited (GGL) but was entitled under the terms of a subscription agreement to receive approximately 25% of the sale proceeds, which was significantly more per share than any other shareholder.
When GGL’s entire share capital was sold to an unconnected third party, Jewson Ltd (JL), in November 2003 and G was paid 25% of the proceeds, HMRC determined that the disposal of the shares was for a consideration that exceeded ‘the market value of the employment-related securities at the time of the disposal’ within the meaning of ITEPA 2003 s 446Y.
GTPL appealed, contending that the shares were sold for their market value so that the whole of the consideration received by G fell to be brought into computation of his capital gain under TCGA 1992. GTPL further contended that the best evidence of market value was what was paid for the shares.
The Special Commissioner dismissed the appeal; GTPL appealed. The Court of Session rejected the appeal and upheld the Special Commissioner’s decision by a two-to-one majority.
The two main issues that arose in this case are:
- whether the disposal of shares in GGL by G was a disposal giving rise to a charge to tax on employment income in terms of ITEPA 2003, s 446Y, which is in chapter 3D of part 7; and
- on what basis the market value of those shares is to be determined for the purposes of s 446Y.
Hearing began yesterday (14 December), and Taxation was there to cover the first reported case on the income tax regime for employment-related securities in ITEPA 2003, part 7.
Proceedings were held before Supreme Court Justices Lords Hope, Rodger, Walker, Brown and Kerr. Mr Michael Sherry QC led the case for GTPL, while Mr David Johnston QC led for HMRC.
Mr Sherry began the proceedings by highlighting the importance of the case due to the uncertainty surrounding how to determine market value under part 7, which has wider implications under other provisions of ITEPA 2003.
Lord Hope’s first question to Mr Sherry was whether he thought G should have been taxed on the date the subscription agreement was entered into. Mr Sherry said that G should have been taxed then if there was an element of reward at that time.
Mr Sherry went on to discuss the issue of the subscription agreement that contains terms on which G's shares were issued. Lord Hope thought this to be a strange concept as it is expected that such terms would be contained within GGL’s articles of association.
Mr Sherry expressed the belief that rights relating to G’s shares contained in the subscription agreement effectively created class rights even though they were attached to a particular individual.
He argued that the subscription rights are class rights, or as close as they can be to class rights. They are the terms on which the shares were issued: that is, ‘they are part and parcel of a bundle of rights attached to shares for the time being’.
Mr Sherry focused on the significance of the ‘authorisation’ of the subscription agreement by the majority of the shareholders. Lord Hope pointed out that the parties to the subscription agreement held 83.8% of GGL’s issued share capital, so that not all of the shareholders in GGL were bound by it.
Mr Sherry pointed out that the parties to the subscription agreement had the ability to amend the articles to ensure that G received his higher, ‘ratcheted’, price.
On this basis, it is clear that to purchase GGL, JL would have to pay a price to G as agreed in the subscription agreement. Otherwise, JL would ‘effectively be purchasing litigation’.
Mr Sherry went on to look at part 7 of ITEPA 2003. He noted that the meaning of ‘market value’ in s421 is the same as that given in TCGA 1992, part 8.
Mr Sherry explained that the same words have been used throughout part 7 in relation to market value - the provisions interrelate. He contended that market value in the context of part 7 (i.e. chapters 2 and 3) takes into account personal/collateral rights such as contracts, agreements, etc, rather than just terms embodied in the defined documents of the security (e.g. articles of association).
Lord Hope asked Mr Sherry whether he was asking the court to consider the subscription agreement as ranking pari passu with the articles. Mr Sherry confirmed that he was.
Mr Sherry went on to explain the scope of chapter 3C saying that the way the provision works is that, when a security is acquired for less than market value, these provisions treat the employee as having received a notional loan on the amount of the undervalue.
Mr Sherry explained that chapter 3C is the mirror image of chapter 3D. Lord Rodger clarified that Mr Sherry’s argument: because for the purposes of chapter 3C ‘outside circumstances’ are capable of affecting the market value of a security, the same applies in respect of chapter 3D even though ‘outside circumstances’ are not expressly referred to.
Mr Sherry agreed and said that he believed that chapter 3 (comprising all of chapters 3, 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D) is a clear, single scheme.
Mr Sherry went on to explain that, if it is correct that personal rights feature in ascertaining the market value, this increases the market value at the time of acquisition and tax is paid under general principles or under chapter 3C as a result. It must be wrong to tax those rights again on disposal under chapter 3D on the basis that tax has already been paid on acquisition.
Under chapter 3D, tax is charged on the disposal of shares, if the right still exists at that time. Consequently, chapters 3C and 3D apply in a residual manner to ensure tax is charged where it has not been charged before.
Lord Hope pointed out that chapter 3C makes the assumption that the security is not a convertible security; therefore assumptions can presumably be made to exclude other rights: e.g. personal rights.
Mr Sherry agreed with this approach. The starting point is chapter 2 that provides that personal rights are to be included for the purposes of determining market value; therefore it follows that there should be a ‘knock-on adjustment’ under chapter 3C.
Lord Hope pointed out that the effect of these provisions is to reduce the tax charge on disposal to nil under chapter 3D. Mr Sherry explained that if G was to be taxed at all in relation to his interest in shares, he should have been taxed on acquisition unless chapter 2 or 3 delays the tax charge to the time of disposal.
Lord Walker asserted that it would be difficult to tax G on acquisition because it would have been unrealistic to put a value on his interest at that time. If it is uncertain what an employee should be taxed on acquisition then he/she should be taxed on disposal. Lord Hope agreed with this, although Mr Sherry did not.
Mr Sherry introduced a new point: he argued that where official statements are made by the government department responsible for administering the relevant legislation, these statements could be considered as persuasive authority on the interpretation of the legislation. That is, the ‘legislative intention’ must be considered.
Mr Sherry was alluding to HMRC’s guidance on employment-related securities which conflicted with their position on this case.
Although the material is no longer on HMRC’s website (it has been replaced by the Employment-Related Securities Manual), there is no suggestion that the information HMRC provided was incorrect or could not be relied upon. No announcement was made to say that it was being formally withdrawn.
One of the justices agreed with this: being the first case of its kind it would be reasonable for HMRC to adhere to their other statements in relation to this issue.
Mr Sherry then turned to TCGA, s 272 in which market value in relation to any assets means the price that those assets might reasonably be expected to fetch on a sale in the open market.
In this case, at the point of sale, a reasonably prudent purchaser would want to look at the sale agreement and the subscription agreement to ascertain how much these particular shares are worth (the case of Lynall was cited).
Lord Hope pointed out that only information that is relevant to the pricing of the transaction would be required by the prospective purchaser.
Mr Sherry then reviewed the provisions of TCGA 1992 and IHTA 1984, pointing out that in both cases the draftsmen contemplated that rights/restrictions that are not inherent in the asset (e.g. outside the articles of association) might affect the market value of an asset.
However, Mr Sherry conceded that under TCGA 1992 it is not clear whether personal rights affect the market value of an asset.
He then went on to discuss the concept of the hypothetical purchaser stepping into the shoes of the actual purchaser, which was developed in cases including
- Attorney General v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218,
- Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26,
- Lynall v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1972] AC 680,
- Duke of Buccleuch & Another v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 1 AC 506, and
- Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gray (Fox’s Executor) [1994] STC 360.
The main points raised:
- Lord Hope pointed out that the purchaser is not a party to the subscription agreement, therefore the purchaser does not ‘stand in the shoes’ of G. Lord Hope found it difficult to see how G’s arrangement with the other shareholders would be of any interest to the any prospective purchaser.
- Mr Sherry contended that the subscription agreement is nothing without the shares, therefore it is valuable in G's hands – and the value can only be realised if the purchaser holds G's shares.
- Mr Sherry pointed out that JL were in the market; therefore the hypothetical purchaser must embody what JL was prepared to pay for GGL. JL may have felt it was appropriate to pay G what was in the subscription agreement as it unlocked the sale. Otherwise, G could have sued the other shareholders who were party to the subscription agreement, which would have delayed, or even stopped, the transaction.
- Mr Sherry cited Lynall to illustrate how one party in a transaction used superior bargaining power to get a better price but then argued that the price paid was less than market value.
Mr Sherry concluded by noting the other authorities that are relevant to this particular case are:
- Cumbrian Newspapers Group Ltd v Cumberland & Westmorland Herald Newspaper & Printing Co Ltd [1986] 3WLR 26 – which illustrates that rights under the articles of association which bind a particular named shareholder can be class rights so long as he/she actually holds shares.
- Harman & Another v BML Group Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 893 (CA) – which illustrates that a subscription agreement can contain rights that attach to shares.
- O'Neill v Phillips (1999) 1 WLR 1092 – which is the authority for the proposition that remedies for unfair prejudicial actions may be invoked where an agreement between the shareholders is not honoured.
The hearing continues, with today (15 December) expected to be the final day. Taxation will be there to report on the main points of interest.







