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Appellant's shares 'of no different value'

16 December 2009
Categories: News
HMRC make case in final day of Gray's Timber

The Gray’s Timber Products Ltd (GTPL) case yesterday entered its second and final day in the Supreme Court. (Taxation’s coverage of the first day can be read here.)

Michael Sherry QC concluded his submissions on behalf GTPL by revisiting the issue of the subscription agreement, writes Komal Saily.

The terms of G’s share issue were expressly set out in the subscription agreement. G’s shares were defined as ‘ordinary shares… to be subscribed to G’. This is narrower than the ordinary shares G actually held.

Mr Sherry referred to how the subscription agreement covers what happens to G’s shares in the event of his death: all G’s shares bar one must be sold. That one share falls in the hands of the estate or a relative. That is, it devolves to G's estate.

Thus, G's rights under the subscription agreement survive death, and hence the estate duty authorities relied on in the Court of Session, were in point.

Mr Sherry demonstrated that the subscription agreement gives rights that continue to apply to G's shares and be enforceable by G even if he ceases to hold such shares. 

Furthermore, under Gray’s Group Limited's (GGL) articles of association (adopted on the same day as the subscription agreement), the directors have traditional discretions – e.g. in the event of death – to register the transfer of shares to the estate.

Therefore, it is possible to transmit G’s shares, and it follows that in those circumstances the holder of the shares will have rights under the subscription agreement.

Lord Justice Walker considered this an extraordinary argument and noted that it is not one that has been deployed anywhere before. Lord Justice Hope agreed and said this argument should have been recorded in Mr Sherry’s written submission to give HMRC's counsel a chance to consider the argument and respond.

Under time pressure, Mr Sherry outlined the pertinent points from his written submissions. He drew attention to Lord Justice Mackay’s Court of Session judgment, where he accepted that, for Jewson Ltd to acquire the beneficial interest in the entire issued share capital of GGL, the payment had to be made to G. In Mackay LJ’s opinion, the payment of this amount was ‘equivalent to a settlement of a debt’ falling due by GGL to G.

Mr Sherry contended that, with regard to employment-related securities, the general rule is that tax arises when a share is acquired. There are statutory rules that defer when the tax is paid. The QC contended that to tax a security on disposal as provided for under chapter 3D of ITEPA 2003, part 7 is therefore a departure from the general scheme.

He reiterated that the rights contained in the subscription agreement are intrinsic to the G shares, and therefore tax is not chargeable under chapter 3D. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the scheme behind chapter 3D.

Finally, Mr Sherry discussed an alternative point, to be considered if his other submissions are unsuccessful: if the subscription agreement creates rights that are not intrinsic to G’s shares then such rights are a separate asset from those shares. This approach was in substance adopted by the majority of the Court of Session.

This point had not expressly been taken previously; it was precipitated by the Court of Session judgment, and it had not been raised with the Special Commissioner. Hope LJ was reluctant to accept it being raised.

Mr Sherry urged consideration of the alternative point and quoted Lord Justice Oliver’s judgment from Brady & Another v Brady & Another [1989] AC 755, in which it was held that it was wrong to ignore such a point where the wrong tax is charged: it is a ‘declaration of illegality’.

He argued that, given the context of the original dispute, being a matter of the statutory construction of part 7 of ITEPA 2003, this point is within the scope of the argument made throughout the case.

Hope LJ agreed the whole scheme of part 7 needs to be considered. Chapter 1 provides a single definition of ‘market value’ that runs throughout the part. When the definition of market value is applied in this way, this limits the scope of chapter 3D whether the rights concerned are personal or not.

David Johnston QC, leading counsel for HMRC, began his case by considering the definition of market value. Section 421 of ITEPA 2003 defines market value as having the same meaning as that given in the TCGA 1992. The proper construction of market value goes back a long way.

Mr Johnston considered in detail the relevant case law in which market value is considered, including Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26, Lynall v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1972] AC 680, Duke of Buccleuch & Another v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 1 AC 506, and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gray (Fox’s Executor) [1994] STC 360.

Mr Johnston’s submissions are summarised as follows:

  • G’s shares are identical to all the other shares in GGL. It is not the case that the hypothetical purchaser postulated by the market value test steps into G’s shoes. In line with Crossman and Lynall, the purchaser can buy shares with rights and/or restrictions attached to them. The rights under the subscription agreement do not affect the price that a hypothetical purchaser is willing to pay. This is because the rights are personal to G and do not attach to the shares. Therefore G’s shares are worth the same as all other shares in GGL. Hope LJ argued that one cannot just ignore the fact G had special rights in relation to his shares that had some sort of value, as it enabled him to insist upon being paid extra consideration for his shares. Mr Johnston said the sale agreement gave the meaning of ‘consideration’ as being ‘undivided consideration’. The allocation of the consideration between the sellers is not a matter for the purchaser.
  • Mr Johnston pointed out that where a hypothetical purchaser buys G’s shares only, G would not get the consideration as set out in the subscription agreement because only 5% of GGL’s issued share capital would be sold.
  • Mr Johnston cited Attorney General v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, Crossman and Lynall, in which the courts were urged to use well-established valuation practices. This approach should be adopted in determining chapter 3D. Brown LJ asked what the role of chapter 3D is: is it to try to ensure that there is a charge to income tax by virtue of employment, rather than a charge to capital gains tax? Mr Johnston agreed it was and referred to the paradigm stop-loss provision, in which the employer indemnifies the employee against any loss in value of the security.
  • Purposive approach: Mr Johnston explained that, although there is a general presumption that employment-related securities should be taxed on acquisition, this presumption is rebutted by clear legislation, as contained in various elements of part 7 of ITEPA 2003. A purposive approach should be taken when interpreting this legislation; the language of the section and the purpose it seeks to achieve should be considered. He contended that, in relation to chapter 3D, personal rights should be disregarded because there is not specific mention. Under chapter 3D, if the actual consideration received is always equivalent to the market value of the security then this provision becomes redundant; there should never be a tax charge.
  • Stop-loss provision: this is essentially an agreement to purchase shares at a price that is different to the market value. If the appellant’s argument is correct then the stop-loss indemnity is taken into account as part of the shares’ market value.
  • HMRC’s FAQs: the Revenue accepted the answers were not clear or accurate, and so the guidance was removed in 2005. No great significance should be attached to this, according to Mr Johnston. The guidance has now been superseded.
  • ITEPA 2003, part 7: Mr Johnston argued it is not appropriate to seek an extensive degree of uniformity between disparate chapters of part 7. They are concerned with charging income tax on employment-related securities. That income tax is measured against the capital gains tax meaning of market value. The differences between the chapters are more striking than the similarities. Mr Johnston disagreed with Mr Sherry’s view that the chapters should be approached with flexibility. Mr Sherry’s suggestion that there is a degree of common ground concerned undervalue at the time of acquisition. This is a general proposition that does not cover other chapters: i.e. chapter 3D, which deals with a tax charge arising on disposal. In relation to the paradigm case for chapter 3D, there is no question of undervalue there at all, just the loss being stopped. The primary purpose of chapter 3D is to cover the stop-loss situation, and it is an anti-avoidance mechanism. Similarly, undervalue is not considered in chapters 3B, 4 and 5. A variety of techniques, some contrasting, are used in part 7. Therefore there is no consistent approach. By way of example, under s 428 (chapter 2, relating to restricted securities) the tax charge is levied by reference to the proportion of unrestricted market value not paid at the outset. Therefore tax is applied on the value arising on the release of the restriction (i.e. it is based on the proportion of the increase in value, as opposed to the whole value). By contrast, under s 479 (chapter 5, relating to options) tax is chargeable on the whole of the gain. Therefore the nature of the tax charge is not uniform across part 7, either. If full unrestricted market value is paid on acquisition then no tax charge arises under chapter 2. Mr Johnston contended that the purpose of each chapter is not necessarily served by using the same interpretation of market value throughout.
  • Chapter 3C: with partly paid shares, the failure to pay the full purchase price is not naturally considered to be a notional loan; it is ‘deemed’ to be. This is different to the stop-loss situation. Therefore chapters 3C and 3D are not necessarily ‘mirror images’ of one another, as Mr Sherry had argued.
  • Chapter 3D: this captures the difference between actual value and an increase in value (i.e. the gain). Hope LJ said it is accepted that the language of the chapter is so wide that one has to rely on the other chapters in part 7 to put it into context. Mr Johnston said the wording of chapter 3D says nothing about how to treat personal agreements; it is silent. Therefore it is only if personal agreements are disregarded that chapter 3D can apply.
  • Mr Johnston argued that in this case, G’s shares are convertible securities subject to a chargeable event. The disposal of G’s shares falls squarely within chapter 3, and that is the basis on which it should be taxed. There is no reason for it to be taxed in two different ways.
  • Collateral documents: under chapter 3 the right to convert can be embedded in collateral documents. This is also expressly stated in chapters 3B and 3C. In contrast, chapter 3D is silent on this point. Rodger LJ made the point that it must therefore follow that, where the legislation is silent on the point, one should not infer it to avoid confusion. There is no reason to infer meaning from provisions in one chapter meaning into another. Therefore, the decision whether collateral documents affect the valuation exercise under chapter 3D should be taken by reference to chapter 3D alone.
  • There was little Mr Johnston could add for HMRC in relation to Mr Sherry’s alternative point given it was only introduced at a late stage. In any event, the question for determination in this case was the market value of the employment-related security. It was not about the new point that had been raised, which in Mr Johnston’s view placed too much emphasis on MacKay LJ’s comments in the Court of Session. Mr Johnston submitted that when dealing with matters of this complexity there was no need to introduce a case (Brady) that is not directly applicable. Mr Johnston urged the court to refuse the alternative point, apparently on the basis that treating the right to enhanced consideration as a separate asset would not be the correct characterisation of the arrangements relating to G's shares.


Mr Sherry responded to the points raised by Mr Johnston largely by reiterating his earlier arguments.

Judgment was reserved.
 

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